

# **“RULES AND REGULATIONS, CORRUPTION AND THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL”**

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# RULES AND REGULATIONS, CORRUPTION AND THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

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## FOREWORD

This paper is divided into two parts: Part I was actually written in October, 1997 following the initiative taken at the 122<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the RCSC to conduct a study of “Work Ethics and Corruption in the Civil Service”. I have left this virtually unchanged, except for the addition of a few graphs and a footnote, and the correction of a few typographical errors. As a result, some of the areas covered here deal with aspects that are the focus of other speakers at this Seminar. This section should therefore be read in the context of the time in which it was prepared.

Part II has been prepared largely with the present Seminar in mind. There were a string of thoughts that, with hindsight, I wished I’d included in the original paper. I have therefore welcomed the opportunity to do just that. I have also tried to include some recommendations, and additional examples and references to support the key thoughts in the original paper.

Much of this paper is based on what I have learned from discussions with individuals of considerable experience, from well recommended books, and observations based on my own limited experience in government. While this paper has been written with a measure of personal conviction, I must emphasise that I am only too aware of my own limitations to affect expertise on the subject. It would be more apt to maintain that, at the very best, this paper can only represent my interpretation of what I *think* I have learnt from these sources. In addition, there are a number of assertions that I have made on the basis of anecdotal evidence alone. While I have had neither the time nor resources to research and validate them, I have personally found such evidence to be consistent and credible.

Having been cautioned in such manner, the reader is instead urged to read the views expressed within, take time to mull over it in the context of your own experience, and finally ascribe it with whatever value you deem it deserves. That much in itself would be reward enough.

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## § PART I

### *An opinion on the present situation*

Work ethics and corruption have an inverse relationship, with the presence of work ethics having a counteracting effect on the occurrence of corruption. Given this relationship, it could be said that the incidence of extensive corruption implies the negligible presence or complete absence of work ethics.

That corruption exists in the civil service is generally known. However, it is still not widely accepted that in the context of the smallness of our civil service, the relative proportion of this corruption is extremely high. Whether it is the case of disappearing stationery in a small store in a small government unit, a manipulated tender opening in a medium size government purchase, or a massive fraud in a major construction or purchase, there is considerable anecdotal evidence of things not going quite right.

If the weight of this evidence is given due consideration, one could only conclude that there is extensive corruption<sup>1</sup> and further that, by definition, this would indicate the absence of basic work ethics.

### *An assessment of steps taken so far*

At this point it may be worthwhile to consider what measures have been taken in the past to prevent this development.

- At a most fundamental level, government has sought to separate financial, administrative and executive powers as much as possible. Hence the existence of centralized AFDs, with separate administration and finance/accounts sections. Most purchasing and stores are taken care of by the administration section. The executive function of actually delivering government projects or services lies with the remaining cadre of officers.
- To prevent undesirable relationships developing across this split in responsibilities, government has resorted to frequent transfers of officers.
- In order to remove discretionary powers of officials, government has constantly sought to develop increasingly more specific rules and regulations as to what procedures must be followed in a varying assortment of situations. These requirements are being implemented by an auditing arm, which continues to be strengthened, most notably with the recent decision to award incentives to auditors for the detection of fraud.

The above list, while not exhaustive, covers the more significant measures taken to counter corruption. It must be accepted that the above measures must have achieved

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<sup>1</sup> Two years on since writing the original paper, my interpretation of the anecdotal evidence remains the same. However, I must emphasize again that this is my personal opinion – I sincerely hope that the course of events will prove me wrong.

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something in the fight against corruption. However, given that corruption is still relatively so high, it must also follow that such measures have not been adequate. The reasons for this include the following:

- The splitting of responsibilities (or the attempt to create "Chinese walls") among financial, administrative, and executive functions has largely failed because connivance among these subdivisions has continued nevertheless. In fact in many cases, where previously only one person was corrupt, following the splitting of powers, as many as 3 or more were drawn into the scheme. In other words, the proceeds are now being shared among as many individuals as are involved in the power sharing.
- The frequent transfers of key officials may have had some of the desired impact in the sense that it has made it more difficult for individuals to sink roots into a system and manipulate it thereafter. However, it has also led to the problem of less continuity on the executive work front.
- The creation of ever more rules and regulations to plug loopholes may have prevented irregularities that depended on such loopholes. Indeed, clarity in such matters is a fundamental requirement. However, as the number of rules and regulations increase, the overall complexity of the system also increases, especially for those officials who are focused on helping achieve targets. On the other hand, it may be noted that for the official motivated by self-interest, no amount of complexity will be too complex – every rule, requirement and loophole will be known to him.
- This is the same difficulty that will be faced by a strengthened Audit. While they will no doubt be armed with increasingly longer lists of rules on which to base their investigations, they will find that all of the additional requirements, procedures, documentation, etc. will be fully provided by those very individuals whom they set out to catch. Increased complexity for such an individual will only require increased sophistication on his part to handle the paperwork, an ability that will, we can rest assured, be honed to perfection.

The trouble with the steps taken so far is that they assume that measures external to the individual can adequately fight corruption. The Royal Audit Authority (RAA), transfers, rules and regulations – these are all external to the individual and the organisation to which he belongs. What compounds the problem is that the individual (and the concerned organisation) merely sees these as adversaries to be resisted, not as solutions to a problem. Indeed, as auditors wield increasingly greater powers, as the finance section mechanically enforces ever more complex financial rules and regulations, the antagonism will increase further. The focus will then shift to rules and regulations, away from the sole reason why governments exist – to judiciously administer and improve the lot of the country.

Further, over dependence on external mechanisms such as auditing by the RAA also wrongly assumes that a force outside of a given agency can have a meaningful impact on its running. This is because such mechanisms, by definition, occur *after* the wrongdoing. The process of control in an immediate sense is completely absent. What is needed much more is a mechanism within the organisation that constantly monitors activities, provides immediate guidance and feedback (both positive and negative), and thereby minimizes wrong doings in the first place.


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### *A possible solution*

The past paragraph may perhaps have given the reader a clue as to the nature of the remedy that is being proposed. The central argument for the failure of past measures to stem corruption was attributed to such measures being external to the individual. In this section it is proposed that the individual be brought back to centre stage.

The hypothesis is as follows:


If we were to categorise people in general on a scale of corruptibility, the categories themselves could include on one end the *unprincipled*, on the other end, the *principled*, and in the middle, the *pliant*. Like so many other things in life, the probability distribution for this classification of corruptibility would likely fit the bell curve (see probability distribution curve below). In its natural state the population would be equally distributed, with half falling on either side of the curve.



While it is unfortunate, it is a fact that despite best efforts, there will always be the *unprincipled*, individuals who are naturally venal. Fortunately, and while not as visible, there are individuals who would rank as *principled*. These are individuals who do not need external mechanisms to frighten them to conform; rather, even when given a free hand – because of inherent integrity, a sense of values or whatever it is that drives them – they tend to put resources to good use.

As the curve shows, in the middle lie the *pliant*, the average person constituting the majority of people. The *pliant* can go either way. If he finds many getting away with corruption he could easily be influenced to follow suit; if adequate control and guidance are provided, he would abide with the law. Clearly, success in fighting corruption will be determined almost entirely by the degree of success achieved in influencing this majority.

Skewed curve: the *unprincipled* dominate



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In the graph above, the *unprincipled* have not been weeded out and are thus in positions from which they wield decision making power. As a result, over time and on the strength of the example set by the *unprincipled*, the *pliant majority* responds accordingly, and the curve skews toward the left. The balance has been tipped unfavourably, and quite simply, the future is threatened.


On the other hand, if the *unprincipled* are successfully weeded out from decision making positions, the *pliant majority* will again respond accordingly, skewing the curve to the right, as the graph below demonstrates. The balance will be tipped favourably, and the prospects for the future improve remarkably. The question is, which way does the curve skew now? Whatever one's answer, the future of generations of Bhutanese rests on it.

Even though they form a small fraction of the population, the fact that the relative prominence of the *principled* and the *unprincipled* makes such a vital difference is explained by the 80/20 Principle.

This principle asserts that “a minority of causes, inputs or effort usually leads to a majority of the results, outputs or rewards.”<sup>2</sup> In the present case this principle predicts that 80% of corruption and other ills will be caused by the 20% of the population, the *unprincipled*, that sit on the left edge of the curve. By identifying and removing such persons we would resolve 80% of the problem.

Conversely, it predicts that 80% of the good that comes Bhutan's way will arise from the efforts of the 20%, the *principled* few who sit on the right edge of the curve. This means that by successfully identifying and according decision making power to such a small group of persons, 80% of our development goals will follow naturally.

Skewed curve: the *principled* dominate



The key to the hypothesis is the belief that the degree of honesty or corruption in any organisation depends on the integrity of one individual or a small group of individuals in that organisation, the *principled*. A further requirement is that such persons are not just incorruptible; they must also have the ability to will this integrity on all those who work with them, and the strength of character to identify and remove those who don't.

Hence the recommended long-term, sustainable solution to counteract corruption is to identify the *principled* persons and to place them in positions that allow them to influence the *pliant*. This would need to be done at every level, from the upper echelons of the bureaucracy down to the humble storekeeper. Once placed, these

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<sup>2</sup> Richard Koch, The 80/20 Principle – a highly recommended reading for anyone interested in enhancing his or her own personal or organisational effectiveness.

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individuals would be able to better identify the *unprincipled* and take remedial or preventative measures.

Sceptics and cynics may scoff at the whole notion of *principled* persons as defined here, and indeed may even argue that this type of person doesn't exist. The answer to this simply is that there is considerable evidence to indicate that such people do exist, at all levels. While a minority, there are a sufficient number of people in every walk of life who believe in fundamental honesty and even handedness. It's just that they are less visible.

The only problem is, how does one identify them?

Here lies the principal stumbling block. The successful identification of the *principled* person is central to the success of this recommendation. Success in doing so calls for the organisational ability to distinguish between the various categories of individuals, to separate the *principled* from the *unprincipled*, the *pliant* and even the poseur.

This would require considerable ability to judge character accurately. If this ability is exercised, then we have a possible solution. If we are not able to meet this fundamental requirement, sadly then, there just aren't any other magical solutions. After all, rules and systems do not enforce themselves – it is *principled* people who do.

Thus the challenge lies not so much in formulating rules but in finding the people who are capable of and willing to enforce them. Given the significant and exponential benefits that stand to be gained – as predicted by the 80/20 Principle – it would be advisable to apply great effort to find and keep such persons.

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## § PART II

### *More on rules and regulations*

In the previous section, I highlighted the inherent problem with depending on rules and regulations. That is not to discount the value of having clearly written rules and regulations. In fact it is of immense value in providing a guiding hand. The point is that its usefulness in this capacity arises only if the concerned person is trying to do a good, cost effective job *in the first place*. With the wrong motivation the rules will still serve as a guide, but only as a checklist to ensure that the paperwork is in order. As I emphasized, the paperwork will be meticulous – but the principal aim of expense control will not be achieved.

The tendency to over value the utility of rules seems to be a global phenomenon. Consider the following view of Norman Augustine\*:


Large organisations seem to be particularly susceptible to the notion that regulations can be a substitute for sound management judgement.

Rules, regulations, policies, reports and organisation charts are not a substitute for sound management judgement. One cannot legislate problems out of existence. It has been tried.

Mr Augustine went on to analyse this proclivity in some detail, and was so moved as to include the following among his total of 52 Laws:

Augustine's Law Number 49: Regulations grow at the same rate as weeds.

His conclusion appears to be backed by the evidence, as the following graph\* shows:



\* From the book "Augustine's Laws", a humorous and deeply insightful study of the practice of management in business and in government.

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The evidence indicates that people tend to try to solve problems by setting more rules. Further, while the high growth rate of rules is discouraging enough, the individual rules themselves are getting more and more complex.

Take for example, the United States regulation governing the *packaging* of whistles bought for the military police\*. This is (or was in 1986) a sixteen-page specification. Section 5.1.1.2 of this specification reads as follows:

Twenty five whistles of one type only shall be packed in a folding paperboard box conforming to variety 1, style III, type G, class i, sub-class 1, of PPP-B-566, or in a setup paperboard box conforming to type I, variety 1, class A, type 4 of PPP-B-676.

Unit pack shall be arranged five in length, five in width and one in depth within an intermediate box. Inside dimensions of each paperboard box shall approximate 12½ inches in length, 6¼ inches in width and 1 inch in depth. The box closure shall be secured with 2-inch minimum width gummed paper tape conforming to type III, grade B of PPP-T-45 applied at the centre of the length opening and extending along the bottom and up each side at ½ inch.

This example, as unreal as it may sound, is a fact. It is the logical result of the inclination to generate ever more rules of ever-greater complexity. Mr Augustine concludes that while rules such as this have proliferated, “overall, it is clear that not much has been accomplished other than to tie the hands of those who in fact happen to be able managers.”

### ***Setting rules – the need for restraint***

**T**he whistle packaging regulation should give us a clear picture of exactly where an unchecked dependence on rules will lead us. Is that where we want to go?

When one considers that well intended rules can themselves be the *source* of corruption, as we shall discuss later, the lesson may be that there is a need to place some restraint on our natural inclination to formulate ever more rules.

One way to do this is to institute a set of rules (there we go again!) to determine if a proposed rule should be introduced at all – “rules for rule makers” – in a manner of speaking. I would venture to suggest several criteria that should be applied before any rule or regulation is passed. The benefits of implementing such criteria will be highlighted, as will the pitfalls of not doing so, particularly in the context of our level of development.

To make this clear, it is necessary to split rules into two broad categories, “*general public impact rules*” and “*technical rules*”. *General public impact rules* are those that affect a cross section of society or the public at large. The greater the number of people affected by a particular rule, the more likely that it is a *general public impact rule*. An exception to this is that even if the number of people affected is small, if that subset represents the less educated/qualified or the more marginalised sections of society, the rule should still be considered a *general public impact rule*. The reason is that this subset is more likely to find it difficult to comprehend and comply with

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increasingly complex rules, thereby resulting in a greater, though negative, public impact.

“*Technical rules*”, on the other hand, target a specific section of people. These include the Financial Manual, the regulations set by the Construction Development Board, the Bhutan Civil Service Rules (BCSR), and the National Execution Manual, to name a few. Such rules usually address specific sectoral needs, and the subset of people affected by them tends to be better educated and qualified. For this reason, even if the number affected seems to be on the larger side, such rules should still be deemed *technical*.

This categorisation is obviously incomplete, and the distinction can blur even between the two that have been identified, but we shall leave it at that as it serves the present purpose. The point to be made is that the arguments that follow are intended to address the creation of *general public impact rules* only. No studied suggestions are offered for *technical rules*. The reason for this is that such rules generally “have” to exist – for example, it is hard to argue that we should not have either the BCSR or the Financial Manual. The only suggestion that could be made when creating *technical rules* is that the aim should be firstly to improve the guidance provided by such a collection of rules, and secondly to increase its clarity from a legal and contractual standpoint. If the aim focuses instead on trying to *prevent* corruption by excessively detailed specifications, it is likely that we will have our very own whistle packaging manual(s).

Having clarified the intention to focus on *general public impact rules*, let us now get on with the matter. For purposes of usability, the following four steps could be applied to vet any proposed rule:

**Step One** Before a rule is introduced, the key criteria should be the importance of having such a rule. If the rule is such that most reasonable people would agree that it is of “grave importance”, then by all means, introduce it – jump straight to step four. Note however, that only those rules that seek to counter clear threats to our society and/or to the nation as a whole should be deemed to be of “grave importance”. Because judgement is involved, great care must be taken before concluding that a rule is in fact of “grave importance”. If the proposed rule doesn’t meet this criteria, go to step two.

**Step Two** The question you should ask is this – Are there any *general public impact rules* under your jurisdiction that are not being fully implemented? If the honest answer is yes, then, as a responsible bureaucrat, you should postpone all thought of introducing the rule in consideration.

Turn instead to the task of reviewing the rules that aren’t being properly implemented, and resolve that situation first. Either implement those old rules or discard them. Unimplemented rules hurt the credibility of government, and the more the credibility is eroded, the greater the difficulty of governing. Worse still, if there are any rules of “grave importance” that aren’t being implemented, some indepth soul searching on the basic efficacy of your office may be necessary.

Also, the more the number of rules, the more the likelihood of forms of selective implementation such as the quiet exemption of relatives and friends. Selective implementation is a form of corruption, and with the passage of time will transform into outright corruption – if an official can get away with exempting relatives and

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friends, what is to stop him from doing the same for monetary or other gain? (This is an example of a situation in which the rule itself is the source of corruption. Given the considerable evidence indicating that this is already happening, there may be an even greater need to institute professional rule vetting mechanisms and institutions.)

**Step Three** If the proposed rule has passed step two, it should be put through two more considerations:

- a) Is it implementable, or rather, given the track record for rules of similar nature, will the proposed rule be implemented across the board?
- b) Is it cost effective? In answering this, the rule maker should consider the fact that the Civil Service, as it is, is acutely short of capable manpower. In this context, are the benefits of the new rule worth the monetary and administrative cost?

If there is any hint of a doubt in answering either question, it might be far better to shelve the proposed rule.

**Step Four** If you've reached this point, the proposed rule probably should be introduced. However, focus must now shift from the justifying of its introduction to care in its formulation. The formulation must be made with careful regard to the calibre of line officials who will ultimately implement the rule.

Let's take an example, say a law that requires us to pay a tariff of 7% of the sale value of registered properties of a hypothetical type XYZ. This seems quite clear cut, except for the bit about who determines the sale value. The key question to be asked is this – Is the general calibre of the officials who implement this rule such that whatever yardstick is used to determine the sale value, that same yardstick is applied every time? If so, the current formulation of the rule is acceptable.

If on the other hand the answer is no, the rule needs to be reformulated. Such an answer would imply that the rule is ahead of its time because the calibre/professionalism of the implementing officials is inadequate and requires developing. In this particular example, the only way to remove the discretionary power would be by fixing the amount to be paid. Further, because the amount is fixed, it would be wise to place it as much on the lower side as possible so as to minimise any adverse public impact.

In general it seems apparent that we are not ready for rules that impose tariffs of the sort that are based on *perceptions* of value. The general level of development in Bhutan seems to indicate that when a tariff is imposed as a percentage of an ill-defined value, it largely serves to give the tariff collector added discretion and clout. This discretion is usually accompanied by even less accountability (the evidence seems to indicate that even fixed rate tariffs can be waived by a sleight of paperwork, without superiors ever knowing), and tends to be used more self-servingly than in the noble spirit in which the rule may have been formulated.

A very important aspect of the above recommendations is the reference to the “calibre of line officials”. To decide whether the line officials are up to the task of implementing a particular rule requires good judgement. One way to arrive at such a judgement is for you, as the rule maker, to mentally put yourself in the shoes of the people who will be affected by the very officials who will implement your rule. If you are sure you will be treated fairly, your line officials are up to the task.

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A better check, however, may be to discreetly but actively obtain feedback from the public on their experience with similar types of rules. Bhutan is a small country, and every one has relatives and friends who are, in one way or other, affected by the *general public impact rules* in effect. If rule makers picked a few of their trusted relatives and friends and got them to talk honestly of their experience with a particular rule or rule enforcer, that information should be given careful consideration, and the rule itself re-examined. The reason is that we, as rule makers, tend to get too distanced from the practical realities of implementation. As following sections will elaborate, the rule maker, in his capacity as the boss, tends to have implicit faith in the rule enforcers who work under him, even though he also tends not to know them well enough to warrant that confidence.

Placing importance on the need for such feedback, followed up with action to obtain it regularly, is vital if government is to be in tune with its most imposing public interface – the point at which rules are implemented. This is particularly important in Bhutan, given that the general public tends to be less educated and more likely to be overwhelmed by the intrusions of officialdom.

In this respect, sensitivity on the part of the rule maker amounts to nothing less than real humanity and enlightenment.

Given this, it may be well worth our while to take one last step and look at *all* existing rules and apply the same stringent filters. There might be a lot to gain from such an exercise for, as *The Economist* plainly put it, “Less meddling and fewer rules will mean less corruption.”<sup>3</sup>

### ***More on focusing on the individual***

**T**his paper has emphasised, directly and indirectly, the importance of focusing more on understanding the individuals who make up the organisation rather than on the rules and regulations that should govern them. However, it was admitted that this is a difficult task. While some have the god given ability to accurately judge character (and thereby pick the right team), the rest of us have to settle for much less.

In fact it is extremely difficult for the average boss to really evaluate the motivations of his subordinates. The reason is quite simple – on the one hand subordinates tend to show only their best side to the boss, and on the other, bosses tend to take the magnanimous view and be more trusting. The problem gets more acute the greater the seniority difference between the boss and the subordinate, and the more accomplished the sycophantic talent of a given subordinate. Further, unlike in business, the task of running a government office does not offer the use of unbiased proxy indicators such as sales generated by or profits earned per employee.

To put it another way, unless the boss has that god given ability, the only way he can be sure he has judged his juniors well, or at least to the best of his ability, is by making considerable effort to do so. If he depends just on the cues that are provided by the subordinate, there is a great risk of misjudgement. Clearly, more time needs to be spent on evaluating the subordinates who make up your team. Without making such an effort there is no way to know who would best fill the key positions further up the hierarchy.

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<sup>3</sup> “Stop the Rot”, January 16<sup>th</sup>, 1999

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How then does one go about making this effort? Consider this thought – all subordinates know their bosses. They *always* know whether or not he is committed, fair, honest or whatever, simply because there is no way the boss can hide anything from them. If the boss favours a relative or diverts some funds, the subordinates are the first to know and resent it. On the other hand if the boss is demanding and brooks no nonsense, but is otherwise fair and honest, the subordinates are the first to appreciate it. The reason is that the flow of information is near perfect in this direction. For similar reasons, subordinates tend to quite accurately clue in on the activities and motivations of their colleagues.

The good news therefore, is that the information that you, as the boss, need, is out there. The only question is how to mine it properly. Probably the best way is to use confidential peer reviews of your subordinates. Specify a range of direct questions that are properly formulated and which can be answered in a Yes/No/Can't Say fashion (or on a scale of 1 – 5), and have the peers *and* subordinates of each subordinate evaluate him/her. Use the information to validate or reject your own judgement. For example, if you, as the boss, think Mr X is a real honest/sincere guy but most of his peers and subordinates don't, it is likely that *you* may need to reconsider your view.

Confidentiality is the key to the accuracy of the information that will be provided. As the boss you need to ensure that even you don't know the author of a particular evaluation. This method isn't perfect, and it is possible that a capable and tough person is deliberately given low ratings or that a popular but otherwise ineffective person is given high marks. However, in the long run, people will realise the importance of being more professional in their evaluation, if for nothing else but the fact that the people they rate highly get the next tier of jobs, and thereby affect their futures. Even so, to be effective, the feedback from the peer review *must* be tempered by the overall sense of judgement of the boss. The final outcome thus depends on the presence of such a sense of judgement.

One may note that at promotion time the BCSR already places prime importance on the confidential ratings given by the immediate and other superiors. The peer review method is suggested to assist this rating process. However, we would have a very fundamental problem if the process of rating itself is not regarded seriously enough. Unfortunately, this appears to be the case. As with many other areas in which difficult decisions need to be made, here too "compassion" and "kindness" (at the expense of the organisation) seem to be the order of the day, with almost everybody being rated anywhere between "very good" and "excellent". If the immediate superior, who should best know the official being evaluated, cannot or does not give an honest assessment, one could hardly expect the RCSC to effectively determine who should or shouldn't rise in the hierarchy.

While in no way is it suggested that harsh evaluation decisions be made for their own sake, it must be said that when such decisions are called for, unless more mettle is demonstrated by the *man on the spot*, great organisational difficulties lie ahead.

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### *Conclusion*

There are clearly many more factors and variables that determine the success of any given organisation, as against the few which have been the focus of our attention and for which some specific recommendations have been made. However, most should generally agree that the few concepts that we have touched upon are fundamental – and that without them, there is no organisation.

Further, the details of the recommendations themselves are less important than their underlying principles. For example, while all may not agree with the specific steps proposed for vetting rules, it is important that we recognise the limitations of rules – and exercise greater restraint and care in their formulation, particularly *with a realistic assessment of the calibre of the officials who are to implement them.*

In addition, considerable time was spent elaborating on how one could judge and place subordinates. Here too one may find practical difficulties of the sort not considered in the paper. The point however, is to draw attention to the fact that we, as bureaucrats, have tended to be absorbed with the formulation and implementation of plans and programmes to such an extent that we have not spent enough time on selecting, placing and evaluating the very people who determine the ultimate outcome. However one sets about doing this, the central point is that this needs to be done.

Given the critical significance of these issues, and towards placing them in proper perspective, we could perhaps meaningfully conclude with the following two thoughts:

In Woodrow Wilson's words, "If there is one principle clearer than any other, it is this – that in any business, whether of government or mere merchandising, *somebody* must be trusted." (Emphasis added)

And in Norman Augustine's, "People are the key to success in most any undertaking, including business. The foremost distinguishing feature of effective managers seems to be their ability to recognise talent and to surround themselves with able colleagues. Once such colleagues are found, it is the ultimate in sound management to reward them generously to assure that they are not lost."

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